Fraud and the Road to Abilene

Over the weekend, an (anonymized) interview was published in a Dutch national newspaper with the three “whistle blowers” who exposed the enormous fraud of Professor Diederik Stapel. Stapel had gained stardom status in the field of social psychology but, simply speaking, had been making up all his data all the time. There are two things that struck me:

First, in a previous post I wrote about the fraud, based on a flurry of newspaper articles and the interim report that a committee examining the fraud has put together, I wrote that it eventually was his clumsiness faking the data that got him caught. Although that general picture certainly remained – he wasn’t very good at faking data; I think I could have easily done a better job (although I have never even tried anything like that, honest!) – but it wasn’t as clumsy as the newspapers sometimes made it out to be.

Specifically, I wrote “eventually, he did not even bother anymore to really make up newly faked data. He used the same (fake) numbers for different experiments, gave those to his various PhD students to analyze, who then in disbelief slaving away in their adjacent cubicles discovered that their very different experiments led to exactly the same statistical values (a near impossibility). When they compared their databases, there was substantial overlap”. Now, it now seems the “substantial overlap” was merely a part of one column of data. Plus, there were various other things that got him caught.

I don’t beat myself too hard over the head with my keyboard about repeating this misrepresentation by the newspapers (although I have given myself a small slap on the wrist – after having received a verbal one from one of the whistlers) because my piece focused on the “why did he do it?” rather than the “how did he get caught”, but it does show that we have to give the three whistle blowers (quite) a bit more credit than I – and others – originally thought.

The second point that caught my attention is that, since the fraught was exposed, various people have come out admitting that they had “had suspicions all the time”. You could say “yeah right” but there do appear to be quite a few signs that various people indeed had been having their doubts for a longer time. For instance, I have read an interview with a former colleague of Stapel at Tilburg University credibly admitting to this, I have directly spoken to people who said there had been rumors for longer, and the article with the whistle blowers suggests even Stapel’s faculty dean might not have been entirely dumbfounded that it had all been too good to be true after all... All the people who admit to having doubts in private state that they did not feel comfortable raising the issue while everyone just seemed to applaud Stapel and his Science publications.

This reminded me of the Abilene Paradox, first described by Professor Jerry Harvey, from the George Washington University. He described a leisure trip which he and his wife and parents made in Texas in July, in his parents’ un-airconditioned old Buick to a town called Abilene. It was a trip they had all agreed to – or at least not disagreed with – but, as it later turned out, none of them had wanted to go on. “Here we were, four reasonably sensible people who, of our own volition, had just taken a 106-mile trip across a godforsaken desert in a furnace-like temperature through a cloud-like dust storm to eat unpalatable food at a hole-in-the-wall cafeteria in Abilene, when none of us had really wanted to go”

The Abilene Paradox describes the situation where everyone goes along with something, mistakenly assuming that others’ people’s silence implies that they agree. And the (erroneous) feeling to be the only one who disagrees makes a person shut up as well, all the way to Abilene.

People had suspicions about Stapel’s “too good to be true” research record and findings but did not dare to speak up while no-one else did.

It seems there are two things that eventually made the three whistle blowers speak up and expose Stapel: Friendship and alcohol.

They had struck up a friendship and one night, fuelled by alcohol, raised their suspicions to one another. And, crucially, decided to do something about it. Perhaps there are some lessons in this for the world of business. For example, Jim Westphal, who has done extensive, thorough research on boards of directors, showed that boards often suffer from the Abilene Paradox, for instance when confronted with their company’s new strategy. Yet, Jim and colleagues also showed that friendship ties within top management teams might not be such a bad thing. We are often suspicious of social ties between boards and top managers, fearful that it might cloud their judgment and make them reluctant to discipline a CEO. But it may be that such friendship ties – whether fuelled by alcohol or not – might also help to lower the barriers to resolving the Abilene Paradox. So perhaps we should make friendships and alcohol mandatory – religion permitting – both during board meetings and academic gatherings. It would undoubtedly help making them more tolerable as well.

What's wrong with senior executive pay – lots in my view

There are three things I do not like about top management pay: 1) they usually get paid too much, 2) way too large a part is flexible, performance-related pay, 3) often, a very sizeable chunk of it is paid through stock options.

I used to think - naively - that high top management pay was high simply due to supply and demand: these smart people with lots of business acumen and experience are hard to come by; therefore you have to pay them lots. These grumpy anti-corporates claiming their pay is too high are just envious and naive. Turns out I was (maybe not envious, but certainly naive).

Pay level

Because digging into the rigorous research on the topic - and there is quite a bit of it - I learned that there is really not much of a relationship between firm performance and top management pay. These guys (mostly guys) get paid a lot whether or not their company's performance is any good. Moreover, I learned what sort of factors push up top managers' remuneration - and it ain't supply and demand. It has much more to do with selecting the right company directors (to serve on your remumeration committee) and making sure you are well networked and socialized into the business elite.* Now I have to conclude: top management pay is generally too high, and quite a bit too high.

Flexible pay

Secondly: where does this absurd idea come from that 80+ percent of these guys' remuneration has to be performance related?! "To reward them for good performance and stimulate them to act in the best interest of the company and its shareholders" you might say? To which I would reply "oh, come on!?" If your CEO is the type of guy who needs 90 percent performance-related pay or otherwise he won't act in the best interest of the company, I would say the perfect time to get rid of him is yesterday. You and I do not need 90 percent performance related pay to do our best, do we? So why would it be allowed to hold for top managers? As Henry Mintzberg put it: "Real leaders don't take bonuses".

Moreover, one should only pay performance-related remuneration if you can actually measure the person's performance. And that is - especially for top managers - actually pretty darn hard to do. The strategic decisions one takes this year will often only be felt 5 or 10 years from now, if not longer. Moreover, the performance of the company - which we always take to proxy the CEO's performance - is influenced by a whole bunch of other things; many not under a CEO's control. Hence, short term financial performance figures are a terrible indicator of a top manager's performance in the job and long-term performance contracts all but impossible to specify. If you can't reliably measure performance, don't have performance-related pay, and certainly not 80+ percent of it. We know from ample research that humans start manipulating their performance when you tie their remuneration to some strange metric and, guess what, CEOs are pretty human (at least in that respect); they do too.

Options

Finally: stock options... Once again, I have to say "oh, come on...". We pretty much take for granted that we pay top managers by awarding them options, but don't quite realize any more why. When I ask this question to my students or the executives in my lecture room ("why do we actually pay them in options...?") usually a stunned silence follows after which someone mumbles "because they are cheap to hand out...?". I usually try to remain polite after such an answer but why would they be cheap; cheaper than cash, or shares for that matter? True, it does not cost you anything out of pocket if you give them an option to buy shares for say 100 one year from now, while your present share price is 90, but if the share price by that time is 150 it does cost you 50. Moreover, you could have sold that stock option to someone who would have happily paid you good money for it, so in terms of opportunity costs it is realy money too. No, stock options are not cheaper than cash, shares, or whatever.

We give them options to stimulate them to take more risk. "Risk?! We want them to take more risk?!" thou might think. Yes, that's what you are doing if you give them options. If the share price is 150 at the time the option expires, the CEO can buy the shares at 100 and thus make 50. However, if the share price is 90 the option is worthless, and the CEO does not make anything. However, the trick is that the CEO then does not care whether the share price is 90 or, say, 50 - in either case he does not make any money; worthless is worthless. As a consequence, when his options (i.e. the right to buy shares at 100) are about to expire and the company's share price is still 90, he has a great incentive to quickly take a massive amount of risk. Going to a roulette table would already be a rational to do.

Because if you placed the company's capital on red, and the ball hits red, share price may jump from 90 to 130, and suddenly your options are worth a lot of money (130-100 to be precise). However, if your bet fails, the ball hits black and you lose a ton of money, who cares; the share price may fall from 90 to 50, but your options were worthless anyway. Hence, options give a top manager the upside risk, as we say, but do not give them the downside risk. Therefore, we incentivize them to take risk. You might think "I seldom see herds of CEOs in a casino by the time options expire, so this grumpy Vermeulen guy must be exaggerating" but I'd reply we have seen quite a lot of casino-type strategy in various businesses lately (e.g. banks). More importantly, we know from research that CEOs do take excessive risk due to stock options (see for instance Sanders and Hambrick, 2007; Zhang e.a. 2008). I think it would be naive to think that we give CEOs 90 percent performance related pay and most of it in stock options, and then think that they will not start acting in the way the remuneration system stimulates them to do. Of course it influences their decisions, and if it didn't, there would be no reason left to make their pay flexible and based on options, now would there?

Therefore, I would say, out with the performance-related pay for top managers (a good bottle of wine at Christmas and, if you insist, a small cheque like the rest of us would do). And while we're at it, let's try to reduce the level as well.


* e.g. O’Reilly, Main, and Crystal, 1988; Porac, Wade, and Pollock, 1999; Westphal and Zajac, 1995.

Steve Jobs’ deification serves a very basic and fundamental human need

“I am not that surprised that an academic of entrepreneurship (are you kidding me?) would lead a story about one of the world's best innovators and CEO's about that he actually and in fact ! OMG had body odour as a teenager because of his diet, not to mention the rest of your embarrassing piece. Forbes would be best sticking with writers that are inspired by such great entrepreneurs as Steve Jobs, and not with writers such as this, who are unhappy they have not had the courage to 'live the life they love and not settle' and so sit in front of their computer with not much else to do but trying to bring others down. Shame on you Mr Vermeulen”.

This is just one of the comments I received on my earlier piece “Steve Jobs – the man was fallible” (also published on my Forbes blog). Of course, this was not unanticipated; having the audacity to suggest that, in fact, the great man did not possess the ability to walk on water was the closest thing to business blasphemy. And indeed a written stoning duly followed.

But why is suggesting that a human being like Steve Jobs was in fact fallible – who, in the same piece, I also called “a management phenomenon”, “fantastically able”, “a legend”, and “a great leader” – by some considered to be such an act of blasphemy? All I did was claim that he was “fallible”, “not omnipotent”, and “not always right”, which as far as I can see comes with the definition of being human?

And I guess that’s exactly it; in life and certainly in death Steve Jobs transcended the status of being human and reached the status of deity. A journalist of the Guardian compared the reaction (especially in the US) to the death of Steve Jobs with the reaction in England to the death of Princess Diana; a collective outpour of almost aggressive emotion by people who only ever saw the person they are grieving about briefly on television or at best in a distance. Suggesting Princess Diana was fallible was not a healthy idea immediately following her death (and still isn’t); nor was suggesting Steve Jobs was human.

We are inclined to deify successful people in the public eye, and in our time that certainly includes CEOs. In the past, in various cultures, it may have been ancient warriors, Olympians, or saints. They became mythical and transcended humanity, quite literally reaching God-like status.

Historians and geneticists argue that this inclination for deification is actually deeply embedded in the human psyche, and we have evolved to be prone to worship. There is increasing consensus that man came to dominate the earth – and for instance drive out Neanderthalers, who were in fact stronger, likely more intelligent, and had more sophisticated tools – because of our superior ability to organize into larger social systems. And a crucial role in this, fostering social cohesion, was religion, which centers on myths and deities. This inclination for worship very likely became embedded into our genetic system, and it is yearning to come out and be satisfied, and great people such as Jack Welch, Steve Jobs, and Lady Di serve to fulfill this need.

But that of course does not mean that they were infallible and could in fact walk on water. We just don’t want to hear it. Great CEOs realize that their near deification is a gross exaggeration, and sometimes even get annoyed by its suggestion – Amex’s Ken Chenault told me that he did not like it at all, and I have seen that same reaction in Southwest’s Herb Kelleher. Slightly less-great CEOs do start to believe their own status, and people like Enron’s Jeff Skilling or Ahold’s Cees van der Hoeven come to mind; not coincidentally they are often associated with spectacular business downfalls. I have never spoken to Steve Jobs, but I am guessing he might not have disagreed with the qualifications “not omnipotent”, “not always right” and, most of all, “human”.

Steve Jobs – the man was fallible

As a student, at Reed College, Steve Jobs came to believe that if he ate only fruits he would eliminate all mucus and not need to shower anymore. It didn’t work. He didn’t smell good. When he got a job at Atari, given his odor, he was swiftly moved into the night shift, where he would be less disruptive to the nostrils of his fellow colleagues.

The job at Atari exposed him to the earliest generation of video games. It also exposed him to the world business and what it meant build up and run a company. Some years later, with Steve Wozniak, he founded Apple in Silicon Valley (of course in a garage) and quite quickly, although just in his late twenties, grew to be a management phenomenon, featuring in the legendary business book by Tom Peters and Bob Waterman “In Search of Excellence”.

But, in fact, shortly after the book became a bestseller, by the mid 1980s, Apple was in trouble. Although their computers were far ahead of their time in terms of usability – mostly thanks to the Graphical User Interface (based on an idea he had cunningly copied from Xerox) – they were just bloody expensive. Too expensive for most people. For example, the so-called Lisa retailed for no less than $10,000 (and that is 1982 dollars!). John Sculley – CEO – recalled “We were so insular, that we could not manufacture a product to sell for under $3,000.” Steve Jobs was fantastically able to assemble and motivate a team op people that managed to invent a truly revolutionary product, but he also was unable to turn it into profit.

When Jobs was fired from Apple – in 1985 – CEO John Sculley took control. Sculley is often described as a bit of a failure, because “nothing revolutionary came out of Apple under his watch”, “he could have done so much more with the company” and especially for “being stupid enough to boot out a genius like Steve Jobs”. However, the years after Sculley took over were some of Apple’s most profitable. The man did something right, and that was focus on exploiting the competitive advantage that Apple had built up.

In management research, following terminology cornered by the legendary Stanford professor Jim March, we often say that firms have to balance exploration with exploitation. Exploration refers to developing new sources of competitive advantage and growth. Exploitation refers to making money out of them. Steve Jobs was “insanely great” at exploration, but not – at the time – at exploitation. Sculley was.

Now Steve Jobs is a legend. And rightly so; our world literally would have looked different without him. However, what Steve Jobs’ legendary status also tells me is that we – mere mortals – are inclined to overestimate the omnipotence of CEOs. We overdo it when we ascribe the failure of an entire company to just one man or woman (e.g. Enron’s Jeff Skilling) but also when we ascribe the entire success of a company to one individual.

Steve Jobs wasn’t omnipotent (John Sculley had qualities Jobs didn’t) and he wasn’t always right (eating only fruits does not eliminate the need for an occasional shower). His day-to-day influence on Apple over the last years must have been limited, given his rapidly and severely deteriorating health. If anything, he simply would not have been able to be around enough to control and take care of everything. Nevertheless, the company did well in spite of his absence. And of course that is his laudable achievement too; he managed to build a company that could do well without him. And perhaps that may prove to be his best business lesson after all: how a great leader eventually makes himself superfluous.

Don’t be mistaken, bankers kill (but they give life too)

"In terms of power and influence, you can forget the church, forget politics. There is no more powerful institution in society than business” the equally famous as illustrious CEO and founder of the BodyShop – the late Dame Anita Roddick – said. And of course she was right. The most comprehensive and dominant institution in today’s society is business.

Business is more influential than people often realize, simply because it creates – or destroys – wealth. And wealth impacts pretty much anything we care about. Whether you analyze crime rates in a particular country, malnutrition, happiness, or infant mortality; a huge influence is how wealthy the particular society is. And wealth is created by business.

As a consequence, for example, the 2008 banking crisis undoubtedly killed people. Infant mortality is closely related to wealth and consequently an economic crisis will among others lead to a surge in infant mortality, somewhere, in some country down the road. It also means that the strategic business choices made by CEOs such as Lehman’s Richard Fuld or RBS’s Fred Goodwin indirectly but significantly influence the survival chances of some baby boy or girl born on the outskirts of London, Cairo, or Detroit. And therefore, whether you like it or not, bankers kill.

But let’s not forget that they give life too. The inverse of “bankers kill” is true too. If banks make wise choices, given their pivotal role in our economies, they can trigger a huge boost to the prosperity of many industries. And the profits, employment, and general wealth created through this boost will really improve the health and survival chances of the baby cradled by her mother somewhere on the outskirts of London, Cairo, or Detroit.

Given the research we have on the link between economic prosperity and infant mortality it would not even be too onerous to come up with some estimate of the direct relationship between Royal Bank of Scotland’s balance sheet and the probability of a baby surviving. We could relatively easily calculate the link between profit and the number of lives saved. I could even imagine that the computer terminals that give live updates of a company’s fluctuating share price – which many corporations have dotted across their entrance halls and offices for everyone to see – would be reprogrammed to display the number of children’s lives saved. Traders walking over to their lunch break could have an immediate update of how many baby lives the deal they just closed saved – or destroyed.

A ridiculous thought? Why? Don’t you care (even) more about the life or death of a baby than your company’s fluctuating share price? I am guessing you do. And you know these bankers aren’t so different from (other) human beings. Your company’s performance also creates wealth, and wealth saves lives. Why then only monitor its financial performance? I tell you, the sandwich you’re having for lunch will taste a whole lot better, knowing that this morning you just saved some unknown baby’s life, somewhere on the outskirts of London, Cairo, or Detroit.

Boards and fraud – who gets the sack and who gets to stay?

We have seen lots of corporate scandals over the past decade, and in many of these cases the boards of directors were up for some heavy criticism. Whether it was Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, or one of the toppled investment banks, their boards took some flack, since of course they are ultimately responsible for the corporation’s actions.



But what happens to such directors? What happens to these people in the business elite when their company, for example, is caught being involved in financial fraud? Well, perhaps not surprisingly – and this may come as a relief – they often get the sack (as research by Professor Arthaud-Day from from Kansas State University and colleagues convincingly showed). Directors associated with financial misrepresentations are often dismissed from the board of their fraudulent company but, interestingly, subsequently they also regularly get the boot at another board. As you may know, outside directors often serve on the boards of multiple companies and a study by Professor Srinivasan from the Harvard Business School showed that they lose about 25 percent of these (rather lucrative) jobs if one of the companies in their portfolio is caught up in fraud.



Yet, this also implies that 75 percent of companies retain a particular board member, even though he or she is compromised having served on the board of another company while it was committing fraud. And that begs the question, what firms decide to retain such a tainted board member, and which ones decide give them the sack?



Professors Amanda Cowen and Jeremy Marcel from the University of Virginia decided to examine this. They managed to collect data on 277 directors who served on multiple boards concurrently, one of which was associated with financial fraud. Their statistical analysis showed that companies that were covered by more equity analysts and governance-rating agencies were more likely to dismiss compromised board members; up to twice as likely. These external observers apparently serve as a bit of watchdog. However, surprisingly, when a company had a relatively large number of public pension fund investors amongst its shareholders, they were less likely to dismiss a compromised board member. Cowen and Marcel speculated that this was because these pension fund shareholders do the monitoring themselves, so that they don’t care much about the company’s directors; tainted or not.



You also have to realize who does the firing; and that is the rest of the board. Cowen and Marcel’s research also showed that very prestigious, well-networked boards were less likely to fire their tainted fellow director. It is well known that boards of directors form a rather cliquish corporate elite. It is not easy to find your way into this world, but once your solidly in, not even a little financial fraud is going to convince your corporate buddies to throw you out.

So, you think you have a strategy? Five poor excuses for a strategy

Most companies do not have a strategy. Ok, I admit it, I do not have any solid statistics (if such a thing were possible) as evidence to back up this statement, but I do see a heck of a lot of companies, strategy directors, and CEOs present their “strategies” and I tell you, I think 9 out of 10 (at least) don’t actually have one.



Sure, it depends on the all-evasive question “what is strategy?” but even if you would take the most lenient of definitions, few companies actually have one. Let me not tire you with some real strategy textbook definitions but if I would just put it as “you know what you are doing, and why”, most firms would already fall short on this one.



Most companies and CEOs do not have a good rationale of why they are doing the things they are doing, and how this should lead to superior performance.



I’d say there are 3 types of CEOs here: 1) CEOs who think they have a strategy; they are the most abundant; 2) CEOs who pretend to think that they have a strategy, but deep down they are really very hesitant because they fear they don’t actually have one (and they’re probably right); these are generally quite a bit more clever than the first category, but alas fewer in numbers; 3) CEOs who do have a strategy; there are preciously few of them, but invariably they head very successful companies.



So what do all these CEOs do, when confronted with the question “what is your strategy?” Well, of course they will retaliate with a powerpoint presentation, headed by the title “our strategy”, and there is stuff on it. It just ain’t strategy.



Let me present you with five such common excuses for a strategy or, put differently, five examples of why the things on the powerpoint are not strategy:



Are you really making choices?

Strategy, above all, is about making choices; choices in terms of what you do and what you do not do. Future Plc for example has chosen to focus on specialty magazines for young males (decent magazines, by the way…) in English. This contains some very clear choices. The point is that what they are throwing away, i.e. choosing not to focus on is meaningful. They concerns things that could have made them money as well. For example, magazines for middle aged women might potentially be very profitable, but that is just not what they want to do, because they think concentrating on a clear set of consumers and products will help them do better. Most companies don’t do this; they cannot resist the temptation of also doing other things which, on an individual basis, look attractive. As a consequence, they end up with a bunch of stuff that appears attractive, but strangely enough they don’t manage to turn them into a profitable proposition.



Or do you just stick to what you were doing anyway…?

Another variant of this is the straightjacket of path dependency, meaning that companies write up their strategy in such a way that everything fits into it that they were doing anyway. And there might be nothing wrong with that, if it so happens that what you were doing anyway represents a nice coherent set of activities. Yet, more often than not, strategies adapted to what you were doing anyway results in some vague, amorphous statement that would have been better off in a beginners’ class on esoteric poetry, because it is meaningless and does not imply any real choice. The worst of the lot I have seen (although low on poetic value) was Ahold’s poor excuse for a strategy, which ended up doing so many different things in so many different corners of the world that they resided to calling their strategy “multi-format, multi-local, multi-channel”. This – not coincidentally – was shortly before the company collapsed.



Your choices have no relationship with value creation (you’re in “The Matrix”)

Sometimes companies make some choices, but it is wholly unclear why these choices would do you any good? It is not just about making choices, you need a good explanation why these choices are going to create you a heck of a lot of value. Without such logic, I cannot call it a strategy. Let me give you an example, which happens to be the most common strategy I have seen among multinational corporations: The Matrix. On the horizontal axis, one puts countries; on the vertical axis, one puts business lines. And the strategy is to tick boxes, as many as possible, as quickly as possible (preferably through acquisitions). But why would performing all your activities in all your countries be a good strategy? If you can give me an explanation of why this would lead to superior value creation, I might label it a strategy, but such an explanation is usually conspicuously absent. Without a proper rationalisation of why your choices are going to help you create value, I cannot call it a strategy.



You’re mistaking objectives for strategy

“We want to be number 1 or 2 in all the markets we operate in”. Ever heard that one? I think it is bollocks. A CEO who wrote to me the other day, after having read my book (“Business Exposed”), said of most of these things proclaimed to be strategies that they were like saying “I am going to win the 400 meters during the 2012 Olympics by running faster than anyone else”. Yes, that is very nice, but the real question is “how?” We want to be number 1 or 2 in the market; we want to grow 50 percent next year; we want to be the world’s pre-eminent business school, and so on. These are goals; these are objectives, and possibly very good and lofty ones, but strategy they are not. You need an idea and a rationale – a strategy – of how you are going to achieve all this. Without it, they are an aspiration, but certainly not a strategy.



Nobody knows about it

The final mistake I have seen, but scarily common, of why CEOs who think they have a strategy don’t actually have one (despite circumventing all of the above pitfalls), is because none of their lower ranked employees actually knows about it. A strategy is only really a strategy if people in the organisation alter their behaviour as a result of it. And in order to achieve that, they should know about it… Strategy by itself does nothing; the powerpoint presentation – regardless of how colourful and fine-tuned – is not going to resort to improved performance unless the choices and priorities it contains result into actions by middle managers and people on the work floor. A good litmus test is to simply ask around; if people within the organisation do not give you the same coherent story, chances are you do not have a strategy, no matter how colourful your powerpoints.

Five mistaken beliefs business leaders have about innovation

The vast majority of companies want to be innovative, coming up with new products, business models and better ways of doing things. However, innovation is not so easy to achieve. A CEO cannot just order it, and so it will be. You have to carefully manage an organisation so that, over time, innovations will emerge. And CEOs often make a number of common mistakes, that hamper rather than induce such processes.

Believe the numbers
One common mistake is to insist on “seeing the numbers” too much too soon. “What is the size of the market?”, “what is the Net Presen Value calculation?”, “payback time?”, and so on. What they are forgetting is that, for a truly innovative product, for example, it is impossible to reliably produce any numbers. If a CEO insists on hard numbers before the project is even started, it will by sheer definition kill off any truly innovative ones, simply because you cannot compute the size of a market that does not exist yet.

One CEO who understood this well was Intel’s Andy Grove, at the time that an engineer proposed to him to work on something called a “microprocessor”. The engineer could not produce any numbers, consumer research, and not even a good idea in what sort of applications this product was going to be used, but Grove gave permission and a budget anyway. It made Intel one of the most successful companies the world of business has ever witnessed.

Believe success has been attained
Another innovation killer is sustained financial success. We call it the success trap. When an organisation becomes very good at something, top of its industry, it usually starts to focus on the thing (product, technology, or business model) that made its success, crowding out other options and points of view. Initially, this may make it even more successful, but there is going to come a time that its business context is going to change: new technologies, consumer preferences or foreign entrants emerge. And then the company and its top management finds itself trapped in the one thing it does so well, rigidly believing that what brought it its success, will continue to make it prosper. But, in reality, it is rapidly becoming obsolete.

A great illustration of this is the 43 companies featured in the famous business book “In search of excellence” by Peters and Waterman in 1982. These companies were considered to be the most excellent companies in the world at the time but, at present, only 5 of them would still make the list; many of them having disappeared altogether (e.g. Atari, Tupperware, Digital). It illustrates that, paradoxically, it is especially the most successful companies, the top performers of their industry that find it difficult to adapt and survive when the world around them changes.

Believe they know the competition
What always strikes me, if I ask a CEO (or anyone else in an organisation for that matter) “who is your main competitor?”, they always reply with the company that is most like them. And subsequently they can tell me anything about that firm; its strength, weaknesses, products and plans. But in a way, when it comes to innovation, that is slightly delusional. The company that is most like you is really the least important competitor, simply because they are in the same boat as you are.

The most threatening competition often comes from a completely different angle: an adjacent industry, innovative start-up, or substitute. And that is a phenomenon of all times. Sailing shipping companies suffered from the steam engine, radial tyre champion Firestone was brought to its knees by the introduction of bias tyres, newspapers are being squeezed by the internet, while watchmakers suffer from the fact that nowadays everybody already has the time at hand on a mobile phone or laptop. Thinking your biggest competitor is the company most like you, will leave a company dangerously exposed to outside innovation.

Believe that because everybody had always done it this way, it is the best way of doing things
Industries are rife with habits and business practices from which no-one can quite remember why we do them this way. When challenging a CEO on one of those business practices, he lamented to me “Freek, everybody does it this way, and everybody has always been doing it this way; if it wasn’t the best way of doing things, I am sure it would have disappeared by now”.

And standard economic theory would support his point of view: The market is darwinian, therefore it should be weeding out bad practices. But, in reality, he is wrong. In many businesses, practices emerged with good reason, but once the circumstances changed, firms carried on using them for no reason whatsoever. Did newspapers have to be printed for so long on ridiculously large (and expensive) sheets of paper? Heck no; the english law, set up in 1712, that newspapers were going to be taxed based on the number of pages they printed was abolished in 1855. Could low-cost airlines not have worked many years earlier? Are buyback guarantees in book publishing (set up during the Great Depression) really still needed? Is detailingin the pharmaceutical industry still a useful practice? That everybody does it this way is no reason not to challenge it. The greatest innovations often come from challenging industry convention.

Believe the customer
The final error CEOs often make when it comes to innovation, is to ask their customers for their opinion. Pretty much any company I know has a yearly customer survey. However, there are two things wrong with this. Firstly, these people are already your customer; sure they are going to be satisfied with you; the others have already long voted with their feet. We call it selection bias. You are selecting to ask the ones who already like you, but what about the ones who don’t?

Secondly, even when a company is asking potential customers about their ideas for innovation, in the form of market research, it is tricky. It is usually some shape or form of asking respondents whether they would like (and buy) the new idea. Consumer research often is useful but not for truly innovative ideas and markets that do not exist yet. Research on the fax machine came back unambiguous: every respondent answered that they would never buy a machine like that; likewise for the mobile phone. As Farooq Chaudhry, producer at the highly innovative Akram Khan Dance Company, once put it to me: “Customers? Forget about them”; if you want to be really innovative, you have to be leading the customers; not be led by them.

Is leadership overrated? (maybe not, but only when it is genuine)

When the famous management professor Henry Mintzberg, in an interview for Dutch television, was asked “what would you recommend for leadership in the 21st century?” he answered, without delay or hesitation: “Less of it”.

Henry clearly thought we need less “leadership”, and more people who actually do stuff. And true; it has become a business buzz word and something that everyone puts on his list of career aspirations. However, not everyone can be a leader. Moreover, their effect often seems overestimated.

In reality, business leaders make very few decisions that really significantly impact the course of action of their firms. When a large corporation does well, we attribute it to the forceful, brilliant individual at the top (e.g. Jack Welch, Steve Jobs). When the corporation fails, we also hold the individual crook at its helm responsible beyond mercy (e.g. Jeff Skilling, Dick Fuld). Yet, these individuals’ influences might be overestimated, both positively and negatively, because their decisions often have very limited impact on the everyday practices in their firms.

Yet, I would say that that does not mean they have no influence. They surely do, but it might not be directly through their decisions. CEOs often have a much more symbolic role, in terms of providing inspiration and motivation. And that type of impact can be very real indeed.

Tolstoy – in his epic novel War & Peace, through the eyes of one of its main characters, Prince Andrei – seemed to understand that well. He described how one of the Russian commanders – prince Bagration – in a battle against Napoleon’s army, had very little real influence on how the battle unfolded: stuff just started to happen once the guns got rattling, whatever commands he did or did not shout. However, his presence, and perhaps his successful pretence of planning and control, did have some genuine impact:

Prince Andrei listened carefully to Bagration’s colloquies with the commanding officers and to the orders he gave them and remarked to his astonishment that in reality no orders were given but that Prince Bagration merely tried to make it appear as though everything that was being done of necessity, by accident or at the will of individual commanders, was performed if not exactly by his orders at least in accordance with his design. Prince Andrei noticed, however, that though what happened was due to chance and independent of the general’s will, the tact shown by Bagration made his presence extremely valuable. Officers who rode up to him with distracted faces regained their composure; soldiers and officers saluted him gaily, recovered their spirits in his presence, and unmistakably took pride in displaying their courage before him.

Hence, the impression we have of leaders’ actions, their determination and vision, do influence people lower in the organization, in terms of their commitment and motivation. For example, a study by professors Ping Ping Fu, of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and colleagues, published in the prestigious academic journal Administrative Science Quarterly, asked 177 executives of 42 companies to rate their CEOs in terms of the questions “the CEO shows determination when accomplishing goals”, “the CEO communicates high performance expectations”, “the CEO articulates a compelling vision of the future”, and “the CEO transmits a sense of mission”. They then surveyed 605 middle managers of these same companies in terms of their commitment to the firm and their intention to leave. And the results clearly showed that middle managers who worked for a company whose CEO seemed more determined and better at communicating and articulating a sense of mission and vision, were more committed to their companies. Hence, the image that a CEO managed to exhibit of his leadership and control had a significant impact on the motivation of his middle managers.

Then Ping Ping and colleagues did something interesting. Using an innovative survey technique (called the Q-sort method) they managed to construct a measure of the CEOs’ values. Particularly, they measured CEOs’ self-transcendence values (the transcendence of self interests, enhancement of others’ happiness, and the acceptance of others as equals) and self-enhancement values (which emphasize the pursuit of one’s own happiness, success, and dominance over others) and, surprisingly, the findings described above were only true for CEOs with a healthy dose of self-transcendence values. By contrast, if the CEO secretly harbored some pretty selfish values (i.e. was high on self-enhancement), middle managers were not much motivated and committed to the firm whatever the CEO said or did.

‘What is surprising about that?’ you might think. Well, it may not be surprising that employees prefer their CEOs to have selfless instead of selfish values – I guess we all prefer our bosses to be selfless – but it is a lot more surprising that they are able to detect these values. Because what this study really shows is that, if you had multiple CEOs behaving in the exact same way – expressing a clear vision, showing determination, setting expectations, and what have you – only some of them would succeed in motivating their employees, where others would hopelessly fail. Because what sets the effective and ineffective leaders apart are the values they harbor, in terms of having their own or others’ interests at heart.

Apparently middle managers see right through you. If you, as a CEO, display all sorts of motivating, leadership type behavior, but secretly harbor some pretty selfish values, it simply ain’t going to work. You can shout and dance and do whatever you like, but this motivational stuff only renders the desired effect if you really mean it.

Six scientific ways to suck up successfully (it is not as easy as you might think it is)

Sucking up really isn’t so easy. You can’t just tell your boss “you’re the greatest” because (although he might believe you) he is likely to grasp that you’re trying to sweet talk him into giving you this job, a raise, or a positive appraisal. As a result, it might all backfire because, as we know from research, people who think you are trying to trick them are less likely to actually give it to you. No, sucking up – or ingratiation behavior, as we euphemistically call it in management research – is easier said than done.

But now we have some good evidence – from research by professors Ithai Stern from Northwestern and Jim Westphal from the University of Michigan – how you can make it work, so pay attention:

1. Frame your flattery as advice seeking. For example, asking someone “how were you able to pull off that strategy so successfully” is more likely to hide your underlying motive than “gosh you’re good”.
2. Pre-warn your target that you are going to flatter him or her. For example, let your sucking up be preceded by statements such as “you are going to hate me for saying this but… [gosh you’re good]” or “I know you won’t want me to say this but… [gosh you’re good]” or “I don’t want to embarrass you but… [gosh you’re good] – you get the picture.

Now you that you have mastered the previous two relatively simple skills, it is time to up your game. It requires a bit of planning, but then it is likely to be highly effective:

3. Repeat the opinion that your target expressed earlier to a colleague. You can’t just keep agreeing to everything your boss says in every meeting, now can you? So what can you do? Well, when you find out your boss’s opinion on a particular matter from a colleague, who had a meeting with him earlier, bring up that same topic and opinion to your boss next time you’re meeting with him, before he has had a chance to do so. He will be duly impressed with the sharpness of your analysis.
4. Compliment your boss to one of his friends. So, saying face-to-face to your boss over and over again “gosh you’re good” is unlikely to do the trick. What might work though is to say to one of his friends “gosh, he’s good”. That friend is likely to, at some point, mention to your boss “he sure thinks highly of you”. And since you did not say this to his face, he might actually think you were trying to avoid brown-nosing him! Expect a friendly smile and sudden pat on the back.

Now that you have gained these more subtle skills of sucking up, you are ready to move to the advanced level. This one is sure to work, and you do not even have to say to your boss (or anyone else) that he is the greatest. All you have to do is make him feel the two of you are birds of a feather.

5. Engage in value conformity. What we mean by this is that you start a discussion with your boss by expressing commitment to a cause, institution, or other code of conduct that you know your boss feels strongly about. For example, if your boss is a family-man, begin your casual talk with how important family is to you. Or refer to your joint religion, or if he is into environmental protection, become green too (at least verbally). When you start of with statements that indicate that you share the same set of values, your boss is going to look at everything you subsequently say in a different light.
6. Refer to common affiliations. Similar to the previous tactic, refer to your joint political party, religious organization, or alumni club. These tactics build on so called in-group out-group biases; all of us humans see people who are in the same groups as we are in a more positive light, and your boss is no exception. So emphasize your joint group affiliation, and he will like the rest of you too.

Do these things really work? Yes they do. Ithai and Jim examined these tactics constructing and using an elaborate database on 1822 top executives, measuring their ingratiation behavior (assessed through questionnaires) and various other variables. Subsequently, they examined a rather important outcome variable to these folks: how likely their CEO (i.e. their boss; the target of their sucking up) was to nominate and appoint them to another board of directors on which he served. Directorships are highly coveted (and highly paid) jobs - that is, they want them! And all 6 aforementioned ingratiation tactics worked getting them.

Ithai and Jim also examined what sort of people were more likely to use these 6 tactics to their advantage. Executives with a background in engineering, accounting, or finance were plain clumsy at it. It is not that they did not try to suck up to their boss; they did, but they did it the coarse way (“gosh, you’re great”) and therefore were unlikely to succeed.

The people most skilled at successfully using the six sucking up tactics were executives with a background in sales, law, or politics. Perhaps not coincidentally, these are the professions we most mistrust (if not despise) to tell the truth: salesmen, lawyers, and politicians. They have had to practice these subtle ingratiation tactics all their lives. And it seems, also in the brown-nosing domain, practice makes perfect. And now they are reaping the benefits.

The BP oil rig disaster – better brace yourself: there is surely more to come

Last week’s report of the Presidential Commission examining the oil rig disaster in the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico draws a sharp and clear conclusion about its cause and who is to blame: it is the systemic failure of management; at BP, its partners and subcontractors Transocean and Halliburton. At the end, it also places a bit of guilt on the US government, which provided inadequate regulation and resources.

The report is to be applauded for its clarity and thoroughness, and for recognising the complex and systemic nature of the cause. However, what it fails to recognise is that the structural failure of management is embedded in an even wider context, namely how in our society we run our economies and corporations. Given this wider economic context, it is inevitable that similar disasters – of similar apocalyptic proportions – will happen in the future.

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Strikingly, when reading the report, the parallels between this debacle and other corporate disasters of the recent and more distant past are stunningly clear. Many of the descriptions of how the oil rig disaster unfolded, as well as the reports’ conclusions, for example, could word for word have been taken from reports on the Union Carbide gas disaster in Bhopal in 1984. Swap some names and dates and a few technicalities and the various reports’ descriptions of a lack of a top-down safety culture, design errors, break-down of communication, and the influence of cost-cutting, and so on are near identical. And that tells us something; if alone that this is unlikely to be the last disaster of its kind that we are going to witness.

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In fairness, the committee has done well to resist the common temptation, when looking at things superficially, to name and blame a particular party, or even a particular person, like the Obama government clearly could not avoid the same temptation in the weeks following the disaster, explicitly and exclusively heaping blame on BP and its CEO Tony Hayward in particular. The same happened to Warren Anderson, Union Carbide’s hapless CEO in the 1980s, whose extradition for manslaughter charges is still being sought by the Indian government.

And I am sure these companies are to blame, and their CEOs do carry responsibility for the disaster, but to name and shame them as the sole cause of the misfortune seems a dangerous oversimplification.

Professors Gabriel Szulanski from INSEAD and Sid Winter from the Wharton School, who examined corporate disasters, wrote about this “When people try to explain a disaster after the fact (an accident in a nuclear plant, for example), they are typically under pressure to name a relatively simple cause so that existing policies can be revised to prevent similar events in the future”. We are eager to find a culprit, and someone to blame, and the CEO of the offending company is the most logical and easiest target for our tar and feathers.

But, as the Presidential Committee rightly concludes “the root causes are systemic”, representing an “overall failure of management”, rather than the actions of a particular individual or even a particular firm. When you analyse the lack of communication systems, safety culture, inadequate decision making processes, and so on, a disaster – somewhere at some point – seemed inevitable and the proverbial accident waiting to happen.

The anthropologists Anthony Oliver-Smith and Susanna Hoffman, who examined a variety of man-made disasters, concluded about this “a disaster becomes unavoidable in the context of a historically produced pattern of vulnerability”. And that is what we saw at BP; a pattern that produced a situation that at some point was going to go off the rails. Hence, the committee is certainly right that “the missteps were rooted in systemic failures by industry management (extending beyond BP)”.

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Where the report falls short, however, probably also because it extends the scope and vision of the committee, is recognising that the way BP, Transocean and Halliburton are managed is the logical consequence of how the world of business operates and is organised in our society. The report for example concludes, with ample surprise and indignation, that safety was not the firm’s top priority. Well, of course it is not, I’d say, because in today’s society we tell our companies that their top priority is shareholder value.

Now, certainly this disaster did not do the shareholders of BP much good, but the point is that, in financial terms, there is an optimal risk-return trade-off to be made. And all BP did and has been doing is to optimise that trade-off for its shareholders – precisely as we expect them to do.

Whenever I ask a group of executives to whom the ultimate responsibility of a company is they proclaim in chorus “shareholders” – some of them even get annoyed if not angry by questioning that very assumption. Because that is what they are supposed to do: maximise the value of the corporation for its owners. And, as said, that implies making risk-return trade-offs. The tricky thing is of course that such trade-offs inevitably at some point somewhere down the line lead to something going seriously off the rails.

In fact, the way we remunerate top managers – including Tony Hayward – is largely through stock options. The only reason to so abundantly use stock options (and not, for instance, stock) is that they stimulate top managers to take more risk. And the world of business and our stock markets in specific are organised in such a way that we believe that that is what we want: top managers who take risks. We applaud them when it goes well, but we vilify them when it goes badly wrong, although that’s simply the other, inevitable side of the same risky coin.

Of course, oil disasters are the type of risk we would like them to avoid, but governance mechanisms such as stock options simply stimulate risk taking and do not discriminate between different types of risk. Research – by professors Gerry Sanders from Rice University and Don Hambrick from Penn State – confirmed that CEOs with more stock options take more risks, but they also experience bigger losses. Furthermore, research by professors Xiaomeng Zhang and colleagues from the American University of Washington showed that option-loaded CEOs are more likely to engage in earnings manipulations. Clearly these are not the risks we want CEOs to take, but they are the logical consequence of the way we remunerate them. We ask and reward them for taking risks, so they do.

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‘But I did not ask them to take more risk’, you might think. But yes, you probably did. Perhaps not directly, but indirectly; very likely. Individual investors select shares with the highest return and track record, consumers select the bank with the best rates, your pension fund invests your savings in companies with the highest risk-return trade-off, and so on. By selecting the best returns, we stimulate those companies to optimise their own risk-return balance. As individuals, we just look at the financial results, and seldom query how they came about.

But at least we are in good company; following the recent banking crisis, even the Church of England was found to have invested in the same financial instruments they so heavily criticised after the collapse of the financial system. However, you just cannot have your cake and eat it too. If we design a system in which firms are expected to maximise shareholder value and CEOs are stimulated to take risks, some of the investments are going to go wrong. And both Union Carbide in Bhopal and BP in the Gulf of Mexico were clearly investments that went wrong.

So the White House committee was right; the Deep Water Horizon rig disaster was caused by a systemic failure of management, but the system surpasses that of the three companies involved. As a matter of fact, whether you analyse the cases of Enron, the old Barings Bank, Lehman or the Royal Bank of Scotland, similar conclusions would be drawn. All these firms and managers operated conditioned by the economic context in which they operated. And since the Presidential Commission is unlikely to change that very context, we will be facing more such corporate disasters of the same kind at some point in the future.

The looks of a leader

Attractive people are generally seen as more competent and fit for their job. For example, experiments using headshot photographs of people mixed with random CVs generally show that people rated as physically more attractive also receive higher ratings in terms of “job competence”. Men deemed to be handsome are more likely to be regarded good business leaders. Yet, we know that, at the same time, for example intelligence and physical attractiveness don’t correlate (positively or negatively!). Hence, it is purely a physical preference; and nothing else.

The most striking example and evidence of this I found was not in an experiment on business leaders but from an experiment on political leaders – although I am sure the situation won’t be much different for business leaders.

Two researchers from the faculty of business and economics at the University of Lausanne - John Antonakis and Olaf Dalgas – ran an experiment in which they gave 684 people in Switzerland photographs – and nothing else – of the pairs of faces (the winner and runner-up) from the run-off stages of the 2002 French parliamentary election. These Swiss people would never have seen and did not know anything about these sets of two candidates. Subsequently they asked them “who do you think will win this election?” In 72 percent of the cases, having seen only the two photographs, people predicted the results of the elections correctly… That’s probably a lot better than most political analysts.

Then they got a little mischievous; they gave the photographs to 681 children and told them “we are going to play boat; who do you want as captain of our ship?” In 71 percent of the cases, the children’s’ choice correctly predicted the winner of the local French parliamentary elections.

We pretend – mostly to ourselves – when selecting a job market candidate, filling out a ballot, or choosing a leader, that we carefully weigh the pros and cons, assess someone’s experience and competence, and make a well-informed rational choice. Yet, in reality, at the end of the day, we’re all just playing boat.

Why analysts appear racist

The following experiment caught my eye: Professor Stephen Sauer, from Clarkson University,
together with two colleagues recruited 101 analysts to review information to value the stock of currently privately held company. All analysts were given the exact same information with two “minor” adaptations: In some of them the CEO had gone to a prestigious university; in some of them to a second-tier school. In some of them the CEO was white; in some of them the CEO was black, thus basically creating four groups (prestigious & white; prestigious & black; second-tier & white; second-tier & black). Then the compared the analysts’ valuations…

In spite of it being “the exact same (fictitious) companies” there were major differences in valuation. By far the highest value the analysts assigned to companies whose CEO was white and from a prestigious university, followed by those from second-tier schools who were black, and second-tier schools who were white. Rock bottom were those companies headed by a CEO from a prestigious university who was black…

Stephen and colleagues found this a rather scary find…

So they decided to run yet another experiment: They recruited another 62 analysts and gave them the same company information. However, this time on half of them, they explicitly stated the following about student recruitment at the CEO’s alma mater:
“The university [had used] a double-blind procedure with no special consideration for gender, race, or ethnicity”, so that it was unambiguous that the CEO had made it into the (prestigious) school purely based on merit, and nothing else.

Now the results changed spectacularly: The companies with CEOs from a prestigious university who were black received the exact same valuation as companies with CEOs from a prestigious university who were white. Apparently, people do not just devalue a company because its CEO is black – phew! – there is something else at play.

Why did they then in the first experiment assign the lowest value to those companies with a CEO of a prestigious company who is black? Well, apparently, whenever people see a black person from a prestigious university, they are inclined to assume that he might have been admitted there not based on merit but because of some sort of affirmative action…: positive discrimination. And hence, that it is likely that he is not as good as his credentials might suggest. And of course, statistically they are right…; black males are more likely to have been admitted to B-school due to affirmative action than white males (for the simple reason that the number of white males admitted due to affirmative action is quite certain to be zero). Take away that possibility and analysts don’t care about the colour of someone’s skin.

But that of course does not mean that all black males are admitted to a prestigious school due to affirmative action. It doesn’t even mean that most black males are admitted to a prestigious university for that reason. So analysts do get it wrong rather often, and that must be one darn annoying thing, if you’re a black male at a prestigious university who simply made it in based on merit, and nothing else.

Does an MBA make you unethical? Finally some evidence

While, a year or two ago, the dust clouds of the fallen giant investment banks were still settling, at many a place the discussion opened whether it was these CEOs' business school education that caused him (invariably him…) to act in such a selfish, destructive and unethical way.

For example, Forbes debated the issue heavily under the title “are B-schools to blame?” while at the Harvard Business Review a discussion raged under the highly similar header of “are business schools to blame?” (as if they plagiarised each other… which I thought would add some juice to an ethics discussion…). Although there was the occasional stern defendant of the system, most treated the question as a rhetorical one (“yes, of course!”) and vehemently declared denial itself to be almost as unethical as the destructive actions themselves.

But what’s the evidence; was there any presented? Do we actually know whether earning an MBA makes one behave more unethical and less socially responsive? No we don’t. I was asked by a BBC World presenter, after giving a speech at the Rotterdam School of Management, whether it wasn’t true that most of the corporate villains had MBAs? I had to admit I didn’t know but, even if it were true – that most of the disgraced (and sometimes jailed) corporate villains were lauded with an MBA – what does it prove?

Suppose that 60 percent of the villains had MBAs; perhaps 70 percent of all major corporations in the world are headed by MBAs; this would actually imply that of the villains relatively fewer have an MBA than of all (non-villain) corporate big shots! It is irrelevant whether most villains had an MBA; the relevant question is whether getting the MBA made them more likely to be vile. And frankly, that we did not know.

And I say “did” because now we do – at least sort of. Professors Daniel Slater from Union University and Heather Dixon-Fowler from Appalachian State University decided to, rather than contribute yet another 'informed opinion' and 'point of view', actually test the conjecture. And, in retrospect, that wasn’t so hard to do…

Because they simply looked up the “corporate environmental performance” score for 416 Standard & Poors 500 firms as put together by the company KLD Research and Analytics Inc. Nowadays there are quite a few corporate social responsibility rating agencies and systems around but KLD’s is generally regarded a very good one, because they are fully independent and really track a variety of indicators, gathering the information from multiple sources, including extensive inspection of public records, surveys, and on-site facility inspections. Dan and Heather also looked up whether those companies had CEOs with or without an MBA, and used that to compute whether firms with MBAs at the helm performed any worse in terms of corporate environmental performance than firms with a CEO who did not go to B-school.

And the answer was a resounding no. They checked whether this effect could be due to all sorts of confounding variables (like the CEO's functional background, age, education level, firm size, prior financial performance, type of industry, etc.) but, nope, really: the companies headed by MBAs were no more likely to be vile.

As a matter of fact, they were less likely to be vile! Companies with CEOs with an MBA generally did better in terms of corporate environmental performance; it were the non-business-educated chief executives that engaged in the bad stuff. I reckon that’s quite a shocker to the average righteous blogger in leftish spheres: business school actually makes one more socially aware and responsive!

And, on a final note, it didn’t make any difference whether you were from Ivey League Harvard or had your MBA from the University of New South Nebraska State; programme rank had no influence on these blissful results.

And now I am going to take a walk down our corridor to the office of our Ethics Professor and apologise for calling her course “pointless”… See you later.

Communicating strategy

Whether you are heading up a team, a business unit, or an entire Plc, you’re going to need a strategy. And you are going to have to communicate that strategy clearly to others, because only if others are aware of it can they actually contribute to it, and will it have any effect – a carefully crafted strategy document, no matter how elaborate and sophisticated, is not going to resort to much if it merely disappears in a drawer unnoticed.

There are several rules – litmus tests – that any strategy must adhere to, for it to be communicated effectively, whether you are the CEO or a team leader.

Rule 1: Make some genuine, tough choices. Often you hear things like “our strategy is to be a good employer”, but that is not really a strategic choice. Something is only a genuine, tough choice if the converse is meaningful. “Our strategy is to be a lousy employer” is unlikely to be anyone’s preferred choice. CEO Stevie Spring’s choice for Future plc to focus on making magazines for young males is one; magazines for middle aged women, for example, could have been a genuine option.

Rule 2: You should be able to capture the essence of your strategy in just three of four points. One point (e.g. “we do magazines”) is meaningless and does not provide any direction. If you provide twenty pointers you are basically telling people what to do – moreover, no-one will actually remember them. We “1) do specialty magazines, 2) for young males, 3) in english” provides lots of direction but also leaves ample room for creativity and growth.

Rule 3: Communicate not only the “what” but also the “why”. Trinity Mirror’s CEO Sly Bailey told me recently that if there was one thing she learned about strategy communication it is that we are always inclined to carefully explain what the choice is, but underestimate communicating the reasons behind it. Research on “procedural justice” proves her right; if people understand and believe that the decision making process had been solid and just, they are inclined to cooperate, even if they do not entirely agree with its outcome. Vice versa, people who agree with the choices but feel the process used to arrive at them was wrong are inclined to withold cooperation regardless of their agreement. Hence, carefully explaining the “why” is at least as important as explaining what the strategy is.

The porpoise–Jack Welch connection

Porpoises truly are very cute animals. They are fun, playful, cuddly, bubbly, and social. Moreover, in many countries and cultures, stories exist about how porpoises saved sailors whose ships sank in stormy weathers far from land, by tirelessly pushing them to safety with their snout. The saved sailors, once firmly ashore, would of course tell everyone the tale of their miraculous saviour, and the porpoises became revered and adorned.

Yet, somehow, whenever I see one (in SeaWorld or on television), they make me think of Jack Welch…

Not because Jack Welch is fun, playful, cuddly, bubbly, and social – not many would put Neutron Jack in that category – but because of selection bias.

“Selection bias” thou might wonder, “what the heck is that?” Well, it basically is a statistical term that explains how we make mistakes and draw erroneous conclusions if we base our analysis only on what we observe, and not on what we don’t see. Let me explain.

Given the abundance of stories, there probably really are sailors who were pushed ashore by a rather helpful porpoise. Porpoises are playful animals and they like pushing things around – including swimming sailors. However, it is quite likely that they don’t give a rat’s ass where they push their newly found toy. They probably push the sailors found in open sea in all sorts of directions; some of them happen to be headed toward land. Yet, for every sailor safely pushed ashore there probably are several seamen who were pushed in all sorts of directions but to land. Unfortunately, they just did not live to tell…

The sailor who was pushed ashore by the porpoise told everyone about his miraculous rescue but his unfortunate colleague who each time was pushed back into open sea whenever he got land in sight, vigorously cursing the bloody animal, did not quite get to tell his version of events.

That’s selection bias, and the world of business is full of it. We analyze companies, investment strategies, and the chief executives of the cases that became a success, but we don’t quite see how many went under following pretty much the same path. Jack Welch’s famously hard-headed management style worked well for GE and pushed it ashore, but who is to tell how many companies drowned receiving the exact same treatment? Basically, we just don’t know, but it would be unwise to just take any “successful” strategy for granted, and mimic the actions in the determined (but possibly false) belief it will lead us to safety too.

Should we stop saying that the market is efficient?

No, we should not stop saying that the market is efficient. We should stop saying that, because the market is efficient, the most efficient firms prevail. Because they do not. And that is because there are always multiple markets going on at the same time.

Take a firm in any market of your choice, and then consider this firm’s internal labor market. It often is a very competitive race who is going to be the CEO of the company. Yet, the characteristics that make a person more likely to win this race do not necessarily make him or her a good person to lead the company. Let me explain.

An interesting line of research in social anthropology analyzed what type of person is more likely to rise through the ranks to become the headman of a tribe. Often, this would be the most fierce, ambitious and aggressive warrior, who would be willing to take on all his opponents in the quest for leadership. Yet, interestingly, although characteristics such as fierceness and ambition would be helpful in becoming tribe leader, these characteristics were not necessarily positive for the future of the settlement, since these type of leaders were prone to take the tribe to war. This would ultimately take its toll on the size, strength and survival chances of the tribe. Thus, the same characteristics that would make people more likely to become the headman were likely to get the tribe in to trouble.

CEOs might not be all that different. Those people who are ambitious, risk-seeking and aggressive enough to be able to rise to the ultimate spot of CEO, just might be the same people who, once they’re there, take their firm on a conquest. Take acquisitions. They often offer the thrill of the chase. You select a target, mobilize resources and lead the attack. Sometimes there are others eyeing your prey but skilful maneuvering and a fierce battle will make you come out victorious again. And another victory means pictures in the newspapers, popping champagne, and a larger tribe to rule and command.

Yet, we have seen many firms going on an acquisition spree, inspired by their ambitious new CEO, who not for long went down in a blaze without much glory. The aggressiveness, boldness, and risk-taking behavior of the person at the helm had brought him or her to that position, but it didn’t translate well into a sensible corporate strategy.

Markets are in some form or another efficient, whether they are internal labor markets or markets for corporate control. But they may not be aligned, and victory in one may very well lead to defeat in another.

CEOs seek external advice – if you pay them for it…

There is ongoing debate whether performance related pay for top managers – in the form of stock ownership, options, or other types of financial incentives – actually works. We know it alters their behavior but does it improve it?

I’ve quoted some of the research in this area before but, in a way, whether or not it does, it remains a bit strange that top managers would need performance related pay. As I have said before, do you really want someone at the helm of your company if he or she only works hard and smart if they are directly rewarded for it? On the other hand, I have to admit, no matter how rhetorical this question is intended, I do guess it is only human…

It is only human that our behavior is altered due to performance related pay; and you and I are probably no exception. The trick then, of course, is to get the right measurement system, and perhaps to no overdo it; too much performance related pay may alter the behavior of top executives in ways you had not quite in mind when putting the measures in place! We’ve seen ample examples of that over recent years…

So, how might it bias top executives behavior in useful ways? Professors Michael McDonald from the University of Central Florida, Poonam Khanna from Arizona State University, and Jim Westphal from the University of Michigan examined an intriguing aspect of CEO behavior, and that is their inclination to seek advice from others.

CEOs often seek advice on strategic issues from executives of other firms. However, we also know from research that – just like humans – they are often inclined to solicit that “advice” from friends and other people who are just like them. In such cases, it is not really genuine advice-seeking, but it serves more in a self-confirmatory fashion; people seek confirmation that what they are doing is right, and what better way to get that by asking the opinion of your friends and look-a-likes.

To examine which CEOs engage in this pseudo-advice seeking and which ones truly turn to people who might actually disagree with them, McDonald and his colleagues surveyed 225 large American industrial and service firms. They managed to obtain information on how often their CEOs sought the input of other top managers outside their own firm and how well acquainted they were to them. Subsequently, they statistically correlated that to the extent to which these top managers received performance-contingent compensation packages, and found a very clear result.

Those CEOs who had a very small performance-related pay component in their compensation package sought very little true external advice. They relied on asking their friends – and perhaps their wife, uncles, and mother – whether they too thought that what they were doing was great, splendid, and spot-on. I guess it helps people feel more confident and self-assured…

In contrast, CEOs with a relatively large performance-contingent component in their remuneration package much more often sought advice from other executives who were not their friends and who had different backgrounds than themselves. These people may be slightly scary (they may actually tell you that what you’re saying is nonsense!) but perhaps also more useful. Moreover, McDonald and colleagues showed that this true advice-seeking significantly helped the financial performance of the CEOs’ companies, in the form of an increase in the company’s market-to-book and return on assets. Thus, the scary stuff actually led to hard cash!

The pay-for-performance construction paid off; it stimulated executives to repress their “it’s-only-human” inclination to avoid asking people’s opinion who might actually disagree with you. It is much safer and more pleasant to make sure to solicit advice from people who will say that you’re splendid, but it is much more useful – and lucrative – to really put yourself to the test. And if you reward them for it, and only if you reward them for it, CEOs – just like humans – will actually be brave enough to take this test.

Stock options, CEO risk taking, and earnings manipulations

Any idea why we continue to reward top executives with stock options? We accept it, nowadays, as a given, but why do we have that practice in the first place?

You might say “because it constitutes performance-related pay; through them, you financially reward top managers for their achievements”. Fair enough. Because for many of us mortals our pay depends to some extent on our performance. However, do realize that for CEOs, for example, this component is often as high as eighty percent. Eighty percent! Do you know many people (employed in the same large corporations that these executives head) whose salary is eighty percent dependent on some measure of their achievements? Not many I suspect.

But, in theory, these large corporations that reward their top managers through stock are right – and I am saying “in theory” for a reason. This practice – of offering CEOs stock-based pay – is a recommendation straight out of something called “agency theory”. It is one of the few academic theories in management academia that has actually influenced the world of management practice. It is basically a theory that stems from economics. It says that you have to align the interests of the people managing the firm (top executives) with those of its shareholders, otherwise they will only do things that are in their own interest, will be inactive, lazy, or plain deceitful. Yep, these economists have an uplifting worldview. But that is why we have such a huge performance-related component in the pay of most top executives.

But are you really sure you want people like that managing your firm? People who will be lazy and only operate in their own interest if given a chance? Do you really want a CEO who really needs performance-related pay and who otherwise, if put on a fixed salary, wouldn’t do much and just hang about? In case you missed it, I intended this as a rhetorical question…

But anyway, we give them stock – and lots of it – to incentivize them. But the question still lingers: why stock OPTIONS? And that’s a story in itself.

Agency theory doesn’t only say that people will be lazy and deceitful if given a chance; it also says that managers are inherently risk-averse; much more risk-averse than shareholders would like them to be. And the theory prescribes that you should give them stock options, rather than stock, to stimulate them to take more risk.

More risk!? you might think. Do we really want CEOs of large corporations to take MORE risk?! Is it not, given recent events in the world of business, that we would like our top executives to be a little less risk taking for a change…? Ah, that’s what you might think now, but it is not what agency theory thinks, and it is not what the incentive structure of most public corporations nowadays is geared to do.

Because stock options do stimulate risk seeking behavior, as we know from academic research. Options, as you might know, represent a right to buy shares at a certain price at some fixed point in the future. If you are given the right to buy a share in company X for $100 in January 2010 and by then the share price of X is $120, you will have made 20 bucks. However, if the company’s share price by then has dropped to $90, your option is worthless; we say it is “out-of-the-money”: you’re not going to exercise your right to buy at 100 when the market price is merely 90.

In that situation, if the CEO of X has many stock options, it stimulates him to be very risk seeking. For example, if by August 2009 the share price is 90, he will be inclined to engage in risky “win or lose” moves. If the risk pays off and the share price rises well above a 100, the stock options will become worth a lot of money. However, if he loses, and the share price plummets even further, say to 60, no worries; it doesn’t matter. The stock options to buy at $100 were worthless anyway; whether the stock trades at 90 or at 60.

And, as said, research by for example Professors Gerry Sanders from Rice University and Don Hambrick from the Penn State University showed that these things work. They examined 950 American CEOs, their stock options, and their risk taking behavior. They found that CEOs with many stock options made much bigger bets; for instance, they would do more and larger acquisitions, bigger capital investments, and higher R&D expenditures

However, they also showed that they weren’t always very good bets… The option-loaded CEOs delivered significantly more big losses than big gains. That’s because they didn’t care much about the losses (their options were worthless anyway); all they were interested in were the potential gains.

Moreover, Professor Xiaomeng Zhang and colleagues, form the American University, examined the relationship between stock options and earnings manipulations; plain illegal behavior. They investigated 365 earnings manipulation cases and showed that CEOs with many “out-of-the-money” options were more likely to misrepresent their company’s financial results (and get caught doing it!).

Hence, even if as a board member or shareholder you’d want to stimulate your CEO to take more risks – and I guess that is a big IF – I am not so sure that stock options will get you the kind of risk you’re after…

Managers and leaders: Are they different?

All these articles about what are the characteristics of a good leader or CEO always make me feel a bit sceptical. Sometimes even nauseous. It always strikes me, when I look into the history of a company and analyse its strategic development that they seem to need top people with widely different characteristics at different points in time.

Take my favourite little English company; the model train maker Hornby. When they were in trouble about ten years ago, its board appointed a tough guy: Peter Newey. He slashed costs, rigorously cut in their portfolio and fired a bunch of people. He wasn’t the most popular guy on the block (he was wise enough not to live in the company’s home town Margate; he might have ended up with a knife in his back) but – be it in hindsight – people also respected him: it was what the company needed at the time, and it is doubtful they would have survived without him.

But then Hornby hired a people guy: Frank Martin. The first thing employees told me about him was: “he is extremely good at managing relationships” (something Newey wasn’t exactly renowned for; and that’s a euphemism). And he was; he built superb relationships with suppliers, customers, retailers and investors. And the company flourished.

Yet, could he have done the tough turnaround job? Doubtful. He simply has other qualities. He too was the right man for the job at the time – just like Newey was.

You see the same thing at companies over and over again. Take Apple; in its early days, the energetic and charismatic Steve Jobs was exactly what the spawning company needed. However, when down-to-earth CEO John Sculley took over (much to the chagrin of Jobs), the company had one of its most profitable runs ever; Sculley didn’t innovate, inspire bold new moves, or initiated great change; he focused on making money, and did that very well.

And that is what the company needed at that point in time. Later, when they needed to be pushed and driven into a new direction, Sculley could not give them one; it was Jobs’ time again, to inspire, initiate and make the company grow. And again he did that very well. The same happened at the famous Swiss watch-maker Swatch: Ernst Thomke created the organisation that led to the emergence of the innovative Swatch; subsequent CEO Nicolas Hayek took the invention and relentlessly managed the organisation into a long streak of dominance and profitability. There is not one type of leader that fits all; different companies, at different times, need different people.

In the classic Harvard Business Review article “Managers and leaders: Are they different?” author Abraham Zaleznik’s answer to this intriguing (and slightly provocative) question was an unambiguous “yes”: Leaders inspire, are emotional, if not neurotic, and they are born that way. Managers are very different; they are rational, balanced, unemotional and easy to get along with (be it perhaps slightly yawning). And it is not that one is superior over the other; different firms, at different stages of their development, need someone who inspires and does extraordinary things. But at other times, you need someone rational and objective, and perhaps slightly boring. Such a person may never be “a leader”, but is a damn good manager.

Sometimes we need to be inspired, take risks and dream up wacky things. Sometimes not. Banks come to mind. Sometimes, there is nothing wrong with a boring banker. Or a boring politician.